The threat to human rights posed by non-state actors is of increasing concern. The author addresses the international obligations of belligerents, national liberation movements and insurgent entities, looks at the growing demands that such armed groups respect human rights norms and considers some of the options for holding private military companies accountable with regard to human rights abuses. The argument developed throughout this article is that all sorts of non-state actors are increasingly expected to comply with principles of international human rights law.
over territory and recognition by governments. 1 International law originally only considered rebels as having international rights and obligations from the time they graduate to insurgency. Traditionally, insurgents were considered to have international rights and obligations with regard to those states that recognized them as having such a status. According to Antonio Cassese, to be eligible for such recognition insurgents need only satisfy minimal conditions:
International law only establishes certain loose requirements for eligibility to become an international subject. In short, (1) rebels should prove that they have effective control over some part of the territory, and (2) civil commotion should reach a certain degree of intensity and duration (it may not simply consist of riots or sporadic and short-lived acts of violence). It is for states (both that against which the civil strife breaks out and other parties) to appraise -by granting or withholding, if only implicitly, recognition of insurgency -whether these requirements have been fulfilled. 2 With regard to an insurrectional group recognized as such by the relevant state, it is clear that there are certain international rights and obligations that flow from this status, depending on the terms of the recognition. 3 Under this traditional international law, insurgents who were recognized by the state against which they were fighting not only as insurgents but also expressly as belligerents, became assimilated to a state actor with all the attendant rights and obligations which flow from the laws of international armed conflict. 4 Today, these recognition regimes have been replaced by compulsory rules of international humanitarian law which apply when the fighting reaches certain thresholds. Commentators such as Ingrid Detter have suggested that the idea that the application of the rules of armed conflict are related to the recognition of belligerency has been ''abandoned'', 5 and Heather Wilson has claimed that, since the First World War, the old law is ''more theoretical than real'', since recognition has hardly occurred since that time. 6 Although the theoretical possibilities remain for states to bestow rights and obligations on rebels by recognizing them as either insurgents or belligerents, it makes more sense today simply to consider rebels (unrecognized insurgents) as addressees of international obligations under contemporary international humanitarian law, especially the obligations contained in Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, in Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions and in Article 19 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property of 1954. These obligations are considered in more detail below. Today, international law imposes obligations on certain parties to an internal armed conflict irrespective of any recognition granted by the state they are fighting against or by any third state. The problem is that governments are often loath to admit that the conditions have been met for the application of this international law, for to admit such a situation is seen as an admission that the government has lost a degree of control and as an ''elevation'' of the status of the rebels.
In some cases written agreements have been entered into during and after armed conflicts. These may contain mutual commitments to respect not only the laws of armed conflict but human rights as well. 7 Such agreements are less focused on the old questions of recognition and simply aim to build confidence, placing the protection of the individual at the centre of such measures. Such agreements are nevertheless sometimes predicated on the actual capacity of the rebels to fulfil the obligations in question. The preamble to the San José Agreement on Human Rights, between El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberació n Nacional (FMLN), included the following paragraph: ''Bearing in mind that the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberació n Nacional has the capacity and the will and assumes the commitment to respect the inherent attributes of the human person. '' 8 In this case the agreement was also signed by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General (Alvaro de Soto), and this fact, together with the arrangements for UN monitoring, suggests that this would constitute an agreement governed by international law between entities recognized as having the requisite international status to assume rights and obligations under international law. 9 This example shows how international law has moved beyond recognition of insurgency during armed conflict to a new type of recognition for human rights purposes. The obligations of the non-state actor in such situations stretch beyond both the duration of armed conflict and the laws of armed conflict.
National liberation movements
An additional category of international actor to be considered in this context is the national liberation movement (NLM). In some ways it is clumsy to list NLMs as non-state actors. Their representatives may reject the label of non-state actor, since not only may they wish to stress their putative state-like aspirations and status, they may sometimes already be recognized as a state member in certain regional intergovernmental organizations. One difference between such groups and the recognized belligerents and insurgents discussed above is that such NLMs may be able to claim rights, and will be subject to international obligations, even in the absence of control of territory or express recognition by its adversary. Article 1(4) of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions classifies three types of war of national liberation as international armed conflict, so that all the rules applicable to those conflicts apply. It covers ''armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination''. 10 Under Article 96(3) of Protocol I, the authority representing the people struggling against the colonial, alien, or racist party to the Protocol can undertake to apply the Conventions and the Protocol by making a declaration to the depository (the Swiss Federal Council).
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Furthermore, such a liberation authority could make a declaration under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
12 Such a declaration can bring into force not only the Weapons Convention and its protocols, but also the Geneva Conventions, even in the absence of the state against which the liberation movement is fighting being a party to Protocol I. 13 In the absence of any declarations having been accepted, however, attention has turned to the customary status of these rules. Suffice it to say that no government faced with a liberation movement accepts that it is colonial, racist or in alien occupation. Arguments before South African and Israeli judges that liberation movements are entitled to privileges under international law have not met with success, 15 although the thrust of the ideas expressed in Article 1(4) of Protocol I seemed at one point to be relevant when it came to sentencing certain South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) fighters in Namibia. 16 Attempts by the Red Army Faction and the Republic of New Afrika to invoke the rule as customary also failed before the courts of the Netherlands and the United States respectively. 17 The category of national liberation movements highlights the fact that non-state actors can become bound by international law pursuant to the terms of international humanitarian law treaties. It also leads us to consider below more closely the situation where armed groups are bound by the laws of internal armed conflict and where they make declarations or enter into agreements to abide by certain international standards.
Rebel groups, unrecognized insurgents, armed opposition groups, or parties to an internal armed conflict
Where there is no recognition of insurgency or belligerency, and the group in question is not a national liberation movement that has successfully triggered the application of the rules of international armed conflict, one is left with an internal armed conflict involving rebels or what are sometimes termed ''armed opposition groups''. The humanitarian law which applies during internal armed conflict gives rise to certain duties for these rebels. 18 The minimum protection offered by Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contains obligations for ''each Party to the conflict''.
These obligations are to ''Persons taking no active part in the hostilities'' as well as to the ''wounded and sick''. The actual prohibitions include murder, violence to the person, cruel treatment, the taking of hostages, humiliating and degrading treatment, and sentences or executions without judicial safeguards. Lastly, the Article includes a positive obligation to collect and care for the sick and wounded.
The designation of a situation as ''an armed conflict not of an international character'', so as to trigger the application of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, is obviously an act of considerable political importance for all sides to the conflict. The rebels will often welcome the designation of their attacks as constituting armed conflict, since this confers a curious sort of international recognition on them, 19 and the applicability of Common Article 3 reinforces the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 20 On the other hand, as already noted, the government may be less willing to acknowledge the situation as one of armed conflict, preferring instead to portray it as a fight against criminals and terrorists. To be clear, the application of the obligations does not depend on any acceptance by the government that the threshold for the applicability of humanitarian law has been reached. In some cases the situation is put beyond doubt by UN resolutions stating that the humanitarian rules contained in Common Article 3 are to be respected by both sides in a particular conflict. 21 Most recently the US Supreme Court has pointed to the applicability of Common Article 3 with regard to the procedural guarantees offered by military commissions due to try individuals captured in Afghanistan during the conflict there between the United States and Al Qaeda. The Court held that Common Article 3 was applicable to that conflict. 22 Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England lates issued a memorandum which started, ''The Supreme Court has determined that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies as a matter of law to the conflict with Al Qaeda.'' The memorandum then requested defence commands and departments to start a prompt review of policies and procedures ''to ensure that they comply with the Standards of Common Article 3''. 23 For our purposes it is worth simply recalling that if Common Article 3 is indeed applicable, then the terms of Common Article 3 refer to obligations for each ''Party'' to the conflict; in this case this means international obligations not only for the United States but also for Al Qaeda (and its members to the extent that their actions constitute war crimes). It would not seem that the US administration considers the conflict to be confined to the period of fighting in Afghanistan. 24 The It is important to clarify the distinction we draw between the struggle in which all countries are engaged in a 'global war on terrorism' and the legal meaning of our nation's armed conflict with al Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters. On a political level, the United States believes that all countries must exercise the utmost resolve in defeating the global threat posed by transnational terrorism. On a legal level, the United States believes that it has been and continues to be engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters. The United States does not consider itself to be in a state of international armed conflict with every terrorist group around the world.
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The protection offered by Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions goes beyond the minimum standards contained in Common Article 3 although the minimum standards contained in Common Article 3 remain in effect even when Protocol II is applicable. The Protocol supplements these standards with extra protection for civilians, children, and medical and religious personnel. It also details the procedural guarantees that must be afforded to people interned or detained. The important point in the present context is that it applies this wide range of duties to both sides fighting the internal armed conflict.
However, in order to trigger the application of Protocol II, the intensity of fighting has to be greater than that traditionally required for the application of Common Article 3. According to Article 1(2) of the Protocol, the Protocol does not apply to situations of internal disturbances, riots and sporadic acts of violence. In addition Article 1(1) of the Protocol requires that the dissident armed groups are under responsible command and exercise such control over part of the territory that they are in a position to carry out military operations and implement the guarantees in the Protocol. This is generally considered to constitute a higher threshold for applicability than Common Article 3. It also suggests that the rebels themselves become bound through their willingness to apply the Protocol. 26 As will be discussed, various theories have been advanced in the past to explain how the rebels as such become bound under the Protocol. Some of these are today less relevant as the key provisions come to be seen as customary international law for the purposes of individual prosecutions. For the moment it suffices to note that in 2004 the Appeals Chamber of the Sierra Leone Special Court simply held that ''it is well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors, At the time of the drafting of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, several states explained their conviction that insurgents engaged in a civil war were simply criminals, and that the protocol conferred no international legal personality on them. 28 However, this treaty is today assumed to contain obligations for rebels who fulfil the criteria in the Protocol and where the fighting has passed the Protocol's threshold. Various theories have been suggested to explain how a treaty such as Protocol II entered into by states can create international duties for the rebel group as such. 29 Today, even in the absence of a consensus on a theoretical justification, it has become clear that, not only are rebels bound as parties to the conflict by Common Article 3 to the Geneva Convention, but they are also bound by the provisions of Protocol II. Indeed, from early on the ICRC Commentary to the Protocol simply asserted this to be the case:
The deletion from the text of all mention of 'parties to the conflict' only affects the drafting of the instrument, and does not change its structure from a legal point of view. All the rules are based on the existence of two or more parties confronting each other. These rules grant the same rights and impose the same duties on both the established government and the insurgent party, and all such rights and duties have a purely humanitarian character.
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The Commentary highlights the theories which allow for the imposition of international duties on individuals and groups and asserts that the fact of application is not challenged by states in practice.
The question is often raised as to how the insurgent party can be bound by a treaty to which it is not a high contracting party. It may therefore be appropriate to recall here the explanation given in 1949:
[T]he commitment made by a State not only applies to the government but also to any established authorities and private individuals within the national territory of that State and certain obligations are therefore imposed upon them. The extent of rights and duties of private individuals is therefore the same as that of the rights and duties of the State. Although this argument has occasionally been questioned in legal literature, the validity of the obligation imposed upon insurgents has never been contested. 31 It may be useful to consider the existing legal arguments for the application of these obligations to armed opposition groups under four headings. First, private individuals and groups are bound as nationals of the state that has made the international commitment. Second, where a group is exercising government-like functions it should be held accountable as far as it is exercising 32 Third, the treaty itself directly grants rights and imposes obligations on individuals and groups. Fourth, obligations such as those in Common Article 3 are aimed at rebel groups, and it has been argued by Theodor Meron that the effective application of these rules should not depend on the incorporation of duties under national law. In Meron's words, ''Therefore, it is desirable that Article 3 should be construed as imposing direct obligations on the forces fighting the government. '' 33 While these theories could all justify the application to individuals and non-state actors of certain human rights obligations found in treaties, 34 the focus has remained on international humanitarian law. 35 The theoretical basis for the application of the laws of internal armed conflict remains misty. Such addressed by humanitarian law; (ii) whether human rights principles would lead to a different result from the application of humanitarian law principles; and (iii) the threshold for the application of humanitarian law is arguably not as high as is presumed so that efforts should concentrate on the application of humanitarian law. Zegveld concludes that ''There is widespread international practice demonstrating that armed opposition groups can be held accountable for violations of international law'' (at p. 151). But she wishes to minimize the application of human rights law to these groups. With regard to the practice she concluded, ''International practice is thus ambiguous on the question of conditions for accountability of armed opposition groups for violations of human rights law. There is some authority for the proposition that human rights instruments could govern armed opposition groups exercising governmental functions. However, this conclusion is mitigated by practice holding armed opposition groups apparently lacking any effectiveness accountable for human rights violations'' (at p. 151). Her recommendation points towards a cautious application of human rights law: ''since the accountability of armed opposition groups is a direct consequence of their status as parties to the conflict, there should be a close link between their accountability and their status. This is also why international bodies are and should be very cautious about holding armed opposition groups accountable for violations of human rights norms. These norms presume the existence of a government, or at least, an entity exercising governmental functions. Armed opposition groups rarely function as de facto governments'' (at p. 152).
humanitarian law and in particular under the Geneva Conventions'' of 1949.
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Interestingly, the resolution goes on to state that ''persons who commit or order the commission of breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches''. This confirms at the highest level that individual responsibility attaches to violations of international humanitarian law in internal armed conflicts (even outside the contexts of Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the regime of the International Criminal Court). It is also of interest that Security Council resolutions in this context demand that ''Afghan factions'' put an end to violations of human rights. In the context of Afghanistan, the demand was focused on discrimination against girls and women, but the resolution also demands that the factions ''adhere to the international norms and standards in this sphere''.
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Moreover, the Security Council went on to suggest that local authorities that did not respect human rights should be denied reconstruction assistance.
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In the context of Guinea-Bissau the Security Council called on ''all concerned'' to respect relevant provisions of humanitarian law and human rights, as well as to ensure unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations. 39 With regard to Liberia, the resolution first mentions the use of child soldiers and then simply demands that ''that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Liberia population, and stresses the need to bring to justice those responsible''. The negotiations over the former Yugoslavia involved the participation of the various parties and the formulae used by the Council in the Resolutions with regard to the former Yugoslavia included demands on various parties to inter alia facilitate humanitarian assistance and cease ''ethnic cleansing'', leading Theo van Boven to conclude, ''The responsibility of Non-State Actors and their duties to respect and to comply with international law, must be regarded as inherently linked with the claim that they qualify as acceptable parties in national and international society.''
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The human rights demands with regard to the treatment of girls and women, access to humanitarian assistance, the use of child soldiers and respect for the civilian population are situation-specific; but the Security Council presumes that non-state actors have international obligations under the international humanitarian law of armed conflict and human rights law. The alternative explanations -that the Security Council is itself recognizing the non-state actor as a belligerent 42 or ''creating'' the obligations for the factions -seem unconvincing and unworkable. The idea that the Security Council creates the obligation for the specific non-state actor being targeted has been specifically dismissed by Christian Tomuschat, who, having reviewed the practice of the Security Council with regard to the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Liberia and Somalia, concluded that:
When pronouncing on the duty of parties to armed conflict to respect human rights standards, the Security Council does not intend to create new obligations. It just draws the attention of the addressees to the obligations incumbent upon them under international human rights law, as interpreted by it. For that purpose, no specific order is necessary.
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For Christian Tomuschat the non-state actors are bound by international human rights law, whether or not they have consented to the relevant human rights rule:
A movement struggling to become the legitimate government of the nation concerned is treated by the international community as an actor who, already at his embryonic stage, is subject to the essential obligations and responsibilities every State must shoulder in the interest of a civilized state of affairs among nations. The rule that any obligation requires the consent of the party concerned has long been abandoned. The international community has set up a general framework of rights and duties which every actor seeking to legitimize himself as a suitable player at the inter-State level must respect.
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But Tomuschat's underlying rationale for this approach is based on a recognition that ''elements of governmental authority have fallen into the hands of a rebel movement''. 45 This leaves open the possibility that, where rebels are not seen as exercising government authority, they may avoid international human rights obligations. It is well-known that neither governments nor international organizations will readily admit that rebels are operating in ways which are akin to governments. Linking rebel obligations to their governmentlike status is likely to result in there being few situations where human rights obligations can be unequivocally applied to insurgents. 46 One effectively returns to the position of those commentators who dismiss the applicability of human rights obligations for insurgents on the grounds that non-state actors rarely operate as de facto governments, 47 and in any event are incapable of protecting human rights. Lindsay Moir accepts the full application of humanitarian obligations for insurgents but is adamant that such non-state actors have no human rights obligations:
Human rights obligations are binding on governments only, and the law has not yet reached the stage whereby, during internal armed conflict, insurgents are bound to observe the human rights of government forces, let alone of opposing insurgents. Non-governmental parties are particularly unlikely to have the capacity to uphold certain rights (e.g. the right to due process, being unlikely to have their own legal system, courts, etc.). 48 Rather than focusing on the obligations that insurgents cannot fulfil (fair trial with legal aid and interpretation, progressive implementation of access to university education), it is preferable to stress that the obligations apply to the extent appropriate to the context. Even conventional human rights law demands that a state take steps ''to the maximum of its available resources'' to fulfil progressively its human rights obligations in the context of economic and social rights. 49 Zegveld in her review of international practice sets out a theoretical basis for the creation of obligations on non-state actors: 44 Ibid., p. 587. 45 Ibid., p. 588. 46 An interesting early example of the UN applying the rights of the child in an agreement with rebels in Southern Sudan emerges from the account by Iain Levine who reveals the rationale that convinced the humanitarian agencies to apply human rights in such a context: ''While it was not for OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan) to determine the political future of south Sudan, members felt that control of territory brought with it serious responsibilities for the well-being of the rights of people living there''. International bodies have generally considered the ratification of the relevant norms by the territorial state to be sufficient legal basis for the obligations of armed opposition groups. These bodies thereby establish the conception of international law as a law controlled by states, under which states can simply decide to confer rights and impose obligations on armed opposition groups. 50 While this approach is considered legitimate for humanitarian law, Zegveld does not consider it appropriate for human rights law due to an assumption that ''The main feature of human rights is that these are rights that people hold against the state only. '' 51 It is suggested that this assumption is no longer valid. The issue of the human rights obligations of non-state actors has arisen as a very practical problem in the context of truth commissions and for UN human rights monitors. The issue arose starkly in the context of the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission. 52 It was determined that at times when there was no armed conflict the insurgents were bound by certain international law principles common to human rights and humanitarian law. The report of the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission referred to human rights violations by the insurgents. The legal analysis is perhaps more developed, since it refers to ''general principles common to international human rights law'', thus suggesting that the insurgents could not be burdened with all the human rights obligations of the state:
127. The armed insurgent groups that participated in the internal armed confrontation had an obligation to respect the minimum standards of international humanitarian law that apply to armed conflicts, as well as the general principles common to international human rights law. Their high command had the obligation to instruct subordinates to respect these norms and principles.
128. Acts of violence attributable to the guerrillas represent 3% of the violations registered by the CEH [Commission] . This contrasts with 93% committed by agents of the state, especially the Army. This quantitative difference provides new evidence of the magnitude of the state's repressive response. However, in the opinion of the CEH, this disparity does not lessen 50 Zegveld, above note 9, p. 17. 51 Ibid., p. 53. 52 See the discussion by Christian Tomuschat: ''For a long time it seemed to be an unassailable axiom that it is incumbent upon governments only to respect and ensure human rights, so that it was inconceivable that groups without any official position could also violate human rights. Here again, the argument of reciprocity is of great weight. Not to subject insurgent movements to any obligation owed to the international community before an armed conflict may be found to exist would leave them exclusively under the authority of domestic law, favouring them, but also discriminating against them at the same time. It was one of the great challenges of the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission to determine the legal yardstick by which conduct of the different guerrilla groups could be measured even in times when one could hardly speak of an armed conflict''. Christian Tomuschat, the gravity of the unjustifiable offences committed by the guerrillas against human rights.
53
The full Spanish version of the report details the principles. A rough translation would mean that these included the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, a prohibition on hostage-taking, guarantees of fair trial and physical liberty for the individual. 54 More recently in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone had a mandate which read as follows:
6. (1) The object for which the Commission is established is to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered. 55 The Commission's Report contains detailed examinations of activity by multiple actors, including not only the insurgents, rebels and international peacekeepers, but also the private security firm, Executive Outcomes. This time the violations by the non-state actors are significant compared with those committed by state actors. The Commission ''found the RUF [Revolutionary United Front] to have been responsible for the largest number of human rights violations in the conflict''. 56 The Commission used the expression ''human rights violations'' with regard to all actors including multinational forces and private security companies.
With regard to internationally legally binding human rights obligations we have seen that these are currently presumed by the United Nations to apply when they are being flagrantly denied by a faction, a party to a conflict, or an armed opposition group. 57 For Dieter Fleck it is simply ''logical'' that if the insurgents can have obligations under humanitarian law they should also be able to bear human rights obligations. 58 From here it is a small step to suggest that such international human rights obligations apply at all times to all armed opposition groups (even before the appeals of the Security Council). The resolution adopted by the distinguished expert body the Institute of International Law, at its Berlin session in 1999, stated that ''All parties to armed conflicts in which non-State entities are parties, irrespective of their legal status ... have the obligation to respect international humanitarian law as well as fundamental human rights.'' 59 With regard to disturbances short of armed conflict the resolution includes an Article X to similar effect concerning fundamental human rights: ''To the extent that certain aspects of internal disturbances and tensions may not be covered by international humanitarian law, individuals remain under the protection of international law guaranteeing fundamental human rights. All parties are bound to respect fundamental rights under the scrutiny of the international community. '' 60 To those who would still prefer to rely simply on humanitarian law I would respond as follows: first, humanitarian law does not usually apply in the absence of protracted armed conflict; second, even when there is a reasonable claim that there is a protracted armed conflict, governments have often denied the existence of a conflict, making dialogue with the parties about the application of humanitarian law rather problematic; and, third, the human rights framework allows for a wider range of accountability mechanisms, including monitoring by 26. I have previously noted that it is especially appropriate and feasible to call for an armed group to respect human rights norms when it 'exercises significant control over territory and population and has an identifiable political structure'. This visit clarified both the complexity and the necessity of applying human rights norms to armed groups. The LTTE plays a dual role. On the one hand, it is an organization with effective control over a significant stretch of territory, engaged in civil planning and administration, maintaining its own form of police force and judiciary. On the other hand, it is an armed group that has been subject to proscription, travel bans, and financial sanctions in various Member States. The tension between these two roles is at the root of the international community's hesitation to address the LTTE and other armed groups in the terms of human rights law. The international community does have human rights expectations to which it will hold the LTTE, but it has long been reluctant to press these demands directly if doing so would be to treat it like a State'.
27. It is increasingly understood, however, that the human rights expectations of the international community operate to protect people, while not thereby affecting the legitimacy of the actors to whom they are addressed. The Security Council has long called upon various groups that Member States do not recognize as having the capacity to formally assume international obligations to respect human rights. 62 The LTTE and other armed groups must accept that insofar as they aspire to represent a people before the world, the international community will evaluate their conduct according to the Universal Declaration's ''common standard of achievement''.
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Alston goes on to include specific human rights recommendations addressed to the non-state actor: ''The LTTE should refrain from violating human rights, including those of non-LTTE-affiliated Tamil civilians. This includes in particular respect for the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, freedom of association with others, family life, and democratic participation, including the right to vote. The LTTE should specifically affirm that it will abide by the North-East Secretariat on Human Rights charter.'' This approach is applied in the joint report on Lebanon and Israel by a group of four special rapporteurs:
Although Hezbollah, a non-State actor, cannot become a party to these human rights treaties, it remains subject to the demand of the international community, first expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that every organ of society respect and promote human rights. The Security Council has long called upon various groups which Member States do not recognize as having the capacity to do so to formally assume international obligations to respect human rights. It is especially appropriate and feasible to call for an armed group to respect human rights norms when it ''exercises significant control over territory and population and has an identifiable political structure''. 65 The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has a human rights field operation in Nepal. The Office reports on the human rights situation. Reports include a special section on incidents involving the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M). 66 Often these cannot be expressed in terms of violations of international humanitarian law since they took place during the cease-fire outside the context of an armed conflict. At one level there is apparently a commitment to human rights by the CPN-M, but this does not really seem dispositive to the UN's reporting. Another section in the report covered killings by an ''illegal armed groups'' known as Pratikar Samiti (retaliation groups) later renamed ''Peace and Development Committees'' as well as killings by a group known as the Special Tiger Force. 67 The UN report does not allege that these groups were supported by the state. Their killings are simply detailed as part of the human rights situation. One recent press release by the OHCHR Nepal Office illustrates the approach:
OHCHR has continued to emphasize in its meetings with CPN-M leaders that abductions of civilians for any reason are in violation of CPN-M's commitment to international human rights standards. These abductions and related investigations and punishment fail to provide even minimum guarantees of due process and fair trial. As a consequence, victims of abductions are vulnerable to other violations of their human rights, particularly their right to life and physical integrity, as in the noted cases. OHCHR concerns in this regard also apply to CPN-M cadres accused of crimes.
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To conclude this section, the assumption of many humanitarian law experts that that human rights law applies only to governments, and not to unrecognized insurgents, is no longer a universally shared assumption.
Successful insurrectional and other movements
The articles of the International Law Commission (ILC) on ''Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts'' 69 stipulate that the conduct of an insurrectional movement, which succeeds in becoming the new government, is conduct which gives rise to state responsibility under international law. 70 In addition to insurrectional movements, ''other'' movements that succeed in establishing a new state will also be held responsible, as a state, for their unlawful acts committed while they were a non-state actor. 71 There is no need in such cases for any recognition until the insurgency succeeds. The new government is obviously recognized in the context of the eventual claim made against it. At that point the insurrectional (or other) movement's behaviour is treated as if it were a government at the time of its internationally wrongful acts. 72 The obligations at the time would include not only the rules of international humanitarian law, briefly referred to above, but also general rules of international law including, it is now suggested, international human rights law. The history of this rule of attribution in the context of state responsibility reflects state practice concerning claims made regarding ''damage caused to foreigners by an insurrectionist party which has been successful''. 74 The background to the rule of attribution involves the substantive law concerning the protection of aliens rather than the laws of armed conflict (which historically were rather underdeveloped with regard to internal armed conflict). Today the substantive law regarding the protection of aliens has been overtaken by the international law of human rights, 75 and it makes sense simply to apply the law of human rights to the successful insurgents.
The definition of ''dissident armed forces'' is said to capture the ''essential idea of an ''insurrectional movement''''. 76 The ILC Commentary suggests that a guide to the sort of groups which are covered by this rule can be found in the threshold criteria contained in Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. Protocol II covers armed conflicts which take place between the forces of a party to the treaty and ''dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol''. The ILC identifies certain situations that are not covered, with the result that groups engaged in such activity would not count as insurrectional movements. 77 Article 1(2) states, ''This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.'' The Commentary excludes from the article's reference to ''other movements'' ''the actions of a group of citizens advocating separation or revolution where these are carried out within the framework of the predecessor State''.
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Unsuccessful insurrectional movements fall outside the application of the rules of state responsibility, but the International Law Commission is careful to state that an unsuccessful insurrectional movement may be held responsible for its own breaches of international law.
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Practical steps taken to ensure respect for human rights by non-state actors in times of armed conflict law, and human rights obligations can be discerned from the practice of the Security Council and applied more generally. Where an insurgent or other movement succeeds in becoming a new government or creating a new state, that new government will be internationally responsible for the violations of international law committed by the movement. But serious practical problems remain; the theory does not work in practice. First, as mentioned above, by relying on the threshold criteria such as those found in Protocol II, 80 one is in reality asking a government to accept that rebels have control of territory and have achieved some sort of authority. Governments have been reluctant to do this or even recognize the arguably lower threshold in Common Article 3, namely that that there is an ''armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties''. 81 Although the treaties are at pains to point out that the application of the rules confers no recognition or status on the rebels, governments nevertheless often deny the applicability of these norms. Does such a denial really matter? As Christopher Greenwood has emphasized, ''the acceptance by a government that an armed conflict exists is not a legal prerequisite'', the obligations in Common Article 3 and Protocol II ''are stated to be applicable provided that certain objective criteria are met''. 82 So if the law applies should we worry about the attitude of the government? The attitude of the government is of course relevant, since it obviously becomes harder to convince the rebels that they should comply with rules that the government is refusing to acknowledge as the appropriate framework for their own troops. Despite the fact that the rules are designed to protect the victims of war, rather than create a level playing field, the reciprocity between government and rebels remains importantand that very suggestion of parity is part of the problem. 80 The Protocol applies to ''all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. (2) This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts''. Article 1(1) and (2). The Protocol has been applied in Russia (Chechnya), Colombia, El Salvador and Rwanda. 81 With regard to Article 3, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's definition of an armed conflict is increasingly applied. In Prosecutor v. Tadić (jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, the Appeals Chamber posited a definition of the meaning of armed conflict and the scope of the obligations: ''an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there''. At para. 70. Second, turning to the rebels, theories concerning why they should comply with these norms are of more than academic interest. Arguments that rest on national commitments or international custom may be rejected by rebels who have neither participated in the process nor been allowed to adhere to the treaty. 83 Reliance on the binding nature of national law (even where this merely implements international law) may be met with a frosty response in situations where the rebels seek to challenge the legitimacy of the regime to adopt any law at all. While some rebel groups seeking to become the government of a state may be looking for international legitimacy, and could perhaps be convinced of the need to accept the application of norms accepted by the international community of states, other groups may have no such aspirations, being content with control of certain natural resources and the opportunity to run organized criminal activity.
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Perhaps it is time for a radical rethink. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International are reporting on armed groups and demanding respect for human rights obligations outside the framework of humanitarian law obligations (recruitment of under-18s, abuses of humanitarian workers, denial of freedom of expression through restrictions on journalists etc.). 85 Human Rights Watch has reported on the forced divorces and physical abuses inflicted by an armed opposition group on their own fighters. 86 In short, human rights monitors are expanding the traditional the traditional normative framework beyond humanitarian law. An interesting development in this field is the adoption of commitments, declarations, codes of conduct and memoranda of understanding by the armed groups themselves. Such texts increasingly refer to human rights standards and have been tailored to the particularities of the situation. The preliminary empirical work done in this area ''suggests that where armed groups do commit themselves to written codes of conduct, this encourages them to respect human rights''. 87 Another study of eleven such codes, with regard to Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, East and West Timor, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation revealed that ''for non-State actors, the agreements refer to international human rights customary law''. 88 This study also notes that all the agreements state that the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid are to enjoy the following rights: ''the right to live in security and dignity, the right to basic needs, the right to receive humanitarian assistance without discrimination and according to basic needs, the right to be involved in humanitarian activities of concern to them, the right to legal and effective human rights protection, and the right to protection against forced population transfer''.
89 Non-governmental organizations such as Geneva Call are engaging with non-state actors to monitor commitments made by non-state actors to Geneva Call in the area of antipersonnel mines, and the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict works by obtaining and monitoring commitments not to recruit or use children in armed conflict. 90 Interestingly, in the context of the Secretary-General's reports on children and armed conflict we have seen how important it is to find practical solutions rather than present a picture based on specific violations of international humanitarian law. In one report the Secretary-General referred to attempts by his Special Representative to obtain commitments from armed groups in Northern Ireland ''to refrain from recruiting or using children in the conflict''. 91 Later the report stated that following a trip to the republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation the Special Representative reported that ''insurgency groups continued to enlist children and use them to plant landmines and explosives''. 92 A few months later we find corrigenda to the report which explain, for example, that with regard to Chechnya the expression ''insurgency groups'' is to be replaced with ''illegal armed groups'' and the inclusion of the following phrase after the reference to Chechnya: ''though the situation there is not an armed conflict within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto''. been made to the entry regarding Northern Ireland. 94 The heading in the Secretary-General's reports now refers not only to parties to armed conflicts but also to parties that recruit or use children ''in other situations of concern''. 95 The United Nations and non-governmental organizations will continue to find practical ways to expose those non-state actors that abuse the rights of children in conflict situations. Where the framework of international humanitarian law is precluded due to the lack of an armed conflict, or the perceived lack of an armed conflict, the UN and NGOs will have to rely on the idea that the nonstate actors involved have human rights obligations.
Private security firms
A first immediate response to the issue of private security firms in the context of armed conflict is to label them mercenaries and hence suggest that they are tainted with illegality and illegitimacy. The modern international definition of a mercenary is problematic and operates in international humanitarian law simply to deprive captured individuals of any right to claim prisoner-of-war status in an international armed conflict. 96 Outside international humanitarian law, attempts to criminalize mercenary activity flounder on a series of definitions which are easy to evade. While the label of ''mercenary'' will continue to be applied to express the speaker's disapproval rather than to describe an individual satisfying the specific criteria under international law, it is suggested that human rights concern in this area is less likely to be about whether an individual fulfils the criteria for being a mercenary and more likely to be focused on issues of corporate accountability, contract law and individual criminal responsibility under the laws of armed conflict. Although treaty crimes concerning mercenaries have been in force for some time with regard to Africa, 97 prosecutions for the crime of mercenarism as defined in the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa treaty or other treaties are rare, even if some quite well-known trials of ''mercenaries'' have taken place based on violations of national law. A second approach is to think about how private military companies may trigger state responsibility under international law. State responsibility applies where the company is either empowered by law to exercise elements of governmental authority or where the company is acting on the instruction of, or under the direction or control of a state. 99 But looking at state responsibility fails to capture the full picture. A more comprehensive approach demands that we ask to what extent there is direct accountability under international norms and procedures for the companies themselves?
The issue of the international accountability of the companies themselves was addressed at the level of the UN Human Rights Commission (now Council). The Council's Working Group on the use of Mercenaries has a dual mandate. On the one hand the Working Group is to monitor the effects of ''private companies offering military assistance'' on the ''enjoyment of human rights'', and on the other hand the Working Group is to ''prepare draft international principles that encourage respect for human rights on the part of those companies in their activities''. 100 In The Working Group also agreed to establish a ''monitoring and complaint mechanism to address complaints regarding mercenaries'' activities'.
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The accountability discussion also involves consideration of the possibility of complaints under the US Alien Tort Claims Act. Genocide, slave trading, slavery, forced labour and war crimes have been said by the US courts to be actionable even in the absence of a state nexus. 103 And the Kadic v. Kradžić decision stated that where rape, torture and summary execution are committed in isolation, these crimes ''are actionable under the Alien Tort Act, without regard to state action, to the extent they were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes''. 104 The Supreme Court in the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain case 105 pointed to a 1984 decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that there was ''insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates international law''. 106 However, the assumption that the crime of torture is confined to state officials has now been rebutted; as the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has more recently confirmed, there is no need for a public official to be involved in order for a private individual to be responsible under international law for the international crime of torture.
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As to whether obligations can extend beyond states and individuals to corporations, this has been presumed in the cases pending in the US federal courts, 108 and was examined in some detail in at least one case. The determination in that case was that corporations do have obligations under international human rights law. In the preliminary stages of the case against Talisman Energy Inc., concerning human rights abuses in Sudan, Judge Schwartz concluded:
[S]ubstantial international and United States precedent indicates that corporations may also be held liable under international law, at least for gross human rights violations. Extensive Second Circuit precedent further indicates that actions under the ATCA [Alien Tort Claims Act] against corporate defendants for such substantial violations of international law, including jus cogens violations, are the norm rather than the exception. 
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But the Opinion determines that the Alien Tort case against the corporation Esmor itself could not be dismissed in a summary judgment, and that the Sosa strict requirements were satisfied with regard to customary international human rights law, in particular the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. The judge carefully took into account the Supreme Court's reference to consider whether there might be alternative remedies to an Alien Tort Claim. In the present case, normal routes of complaint were closed off, either because the private corporation was not bound by the Constitutional and public law protections or because the aliens were ineligible to invoke certain remedies.
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This case represents a clear finding that proceedings may continue under the ATCA against a non-state actor for violations of human rights law. One could easily see the logic being applied to private security companies accused of human rights abuses in other situations.
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Are there less legalistic approaches that could be envisaged? P.W. Singer has suggested that a ''body of international experts, with input from all stakeholders (governments, the academy, nongovernmental organizations, and the firms themselves) could establish the parameters of the issues, build an internationally recognized database of the firms in the industry, and lay out potential forms of regulation, evaluation tools, and codes of conduct that publicdecision makers could then weigh and decide upon''. 114 Singer foresees that the process would involve audits that would ''include subjecting PMF personnel data bases to appraisal for past violations of human rights''. 115 In addition, such a body could not only monitor compliance with international norms but also have ''certain powers to suspend payments. 116 The idea is that an approved and monitored firm could work for the UN and be in a position to win tenders from multinationals ''concerned about their image''. It may seem strange to consider that the ''murky'' world of ''mercenarism'' could be made accountable through market pressures. But two factors make this approach worthy of serious consideration. First, because these firms may be forced to rely on their contractual arrangements with governments to ensure payment, including respect for human rights and humanitarian law as ''essential elements'' of any contract would permit governments to withhold payment under certain conditions. The international arbitration under UNCITRAL rules and subsequent litigation concerning Sandline International and the government of Papua New Guinea ended in a settlement for US$13.3 million. Although this contract did mention ''conformance with the Geneva Convention'', 118 a properly drafted contract term demanding full respect for international humanitarian law and internationally recognized human rights as well as guarantees regarding careful recruitment and discipline for human rights abuses would provide a real incentive to comply with international human rights law due to the prospect of future disputes and settlements.
119 Second, private security firms themselves may be coming to see the advantages of human rights monitoring in order to enter the mainstream and the lucrative possibilities it offers.
Tim Spicer's autobiography, An Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline Affair, contains multiple references to human rights in its opening chapter. Some of these are worth reproducing here for what they reveal about the way in which respect for human rights is presented as part of the solution from the perspective of a non-state actor:
Given that a PMC [private military company] is a business, it is acknowledged that a fundamental law of successful business is that the supplier is only as good as his last contract. Ethical businesses first build a reputation and then work hard to protect it. If a particular PMC performed badly or unethically, exploited the trust placed in it by a client, changed sides, violated human rights or sought to mount a coup, then the company and its principals would find that their forward order book was decidedly thin. Discarding ethical and moral principles can therefore only be a one time opportunity. The chance will not recur and the company's prospects would disappear.
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One hears here echoes of the corporate social responsibility embrace of human rights. The difference may be that, in the context of armed conflict, the With regard to contracts between security companies and corporations she has suggested that the security company should be required to provide its personnel with training in the relevant domestic law and that it should be stipulated in the contract that security personnel will be subject to the domestic criminal law of the country in which they are operating. ''The problem with mercenary activity'', working paper for the UN meeting of the Group of Experts, Geneva Spicer goes on to suggest field-based monitoring of the behaviour of private military companies (PMCs). He suggests that observer teams be deployed alongside the company; operating ''in the same way as a referee at a football match'' (but without the power to send players off, a task which should be left to local commanders). In this way ''the PMC will be fully cognisant of the fact that their actions are being monitored and will not want to be banned from ''playing in another game'' in the future, or to find themselves in front of an international tribunal''. 121 The threat of criminal sanctions may well be an effective form of regulation from a human rights perspective. Yet while many will be subject to the potential jurisdiction of the ICC or the prospect of national trials for crimes contained in the Rome Statute, others will fail to come within the scope of any effective criminal law. 122 The Abu Ghraib scandal has been addressed in various US official reports. Major-General Taguba's Investigation recommended that Steven Stephanowicz, a contract US civilian interrogator, from Consolidated Analysis Centers Inc. (CACI), 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, ''be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file, termination of employment, and generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security clearance for the following acts'', which included the fact that he ''Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by ''setting conditions'' which were neither authorized and in accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse.'' 123 The Schlesinger Report mentions a finding of inadequate training among 35 per cent of private contractors used for interrogation, and suggests that future contracts should specify the experience and qualifications needed. 124 From a human rights perspective, the response to the participation in abuse by private contractors has been rather feeble. There is no sense that any of the companies involved will suffer any disadvantage or have any new incentive to tighten their procedures to avoid future abuse and exclude those already implicated from any future contact with detainees.
A series of expert reports has argued for new regulation for this sector at the national, regional and international levels. 125 Part of the concern stems from perceived ambiguities in international law with regard to the status of the personnel:
126 when can they be considered combatants entitled to prisoner-of-war status on capture? when can they be prosecuted under military law? when does their activity amount to mercenarism? These and other questions concerning state responsibility were tackled in great detail by a group of experts convened by the University Centre for International Humanitarian law (soon Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian law and Human Rights). Space does not permit even a summary of the rich debate, and the reader is referred to the report of the meeting. 127 The general level of concern stems in part from the fact that so few prosecutions have been brought in home countries (such as the United States) for human rights abuses committed in Iraq, 128 given that it is impossible for the Iraqi national authorities to prosecute those working for the Coalition. Concern also comes from a more general suspicion that those engaged in armed conflict and interrogation should be democratically accountable in the public sphere.
In considering the impact of human rights law on various regimes for licensing private security companies, one may begin with the regulation of the private security companies by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. To comply with Iraqi Ministry of Interior vetting standards, employees of private security companies must ''Be willing to respect the law and all human rights and freedoms of all Iraqi citizens''. 129 Note that companies have to submit a minimum refundable bond of $25,000 and that ''any breaches of Iraq or other applicable law by employees or companies may result in forfeiture of the bond''. 130 Prompt action with respect to ''individual violations'' is to be taken into account by the ministry in determining whether the bond should be forfeited in whole or in part. This arrangement should be seen against the context of the situation in Iraq, where contractors are ''immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto''. 131 Although there is obviously a risk that a $25,000 bond could be written off as an operating cost, this sum represents a minimum and one could imagine larger sums, proportionate to the actual contract, which could be used to compensate the victims of any human rights abuses committed by the company.
A further example is provided by the South African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, which states that government approval may not be granted if it would ''result in the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the territory in which the foreign military assistance is to be rendered''. 132 This clause is less about accountability after the fact than about seeking to force into the approval process a consideration of the human rights implications. A poor record on human rights issues would surely render unlikely the approval of any agreement to offer private military services. Operating without approval is a criminal offence which applies not only to natural persons but also to juristic persons, in other words, to the companies themselves.
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The United Kingdom's Green Paper entitled ''Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation'' 134 sets out various regulatory options, ranging from an outright ban, through registration and licensing to a voluntary code of conduct. Human rights obligations figure explicitly in the discussion of a Voluntary Code of Conduct. The Green Paper foresees that such a code would cover respect for human rights, as well as respect for international law including international humanitarian law and the laws of war. 135 It is suggested that a trade association, such as the British Security Industry Association, would police compliance with the code. It is also suggested that the code would include a provision allowing for external monitoring. For many observers, any regulation in this field must take into consideration international human rights obligations and ensure that the companies themselves abide by these obligations. According to Beyani and Lilley, ''The UK Government should ensure that national legislation reflects relevant international human rights and humanitarian law, so UK mercenaries and private military companies do not violate these laws. '' 136 On the other hand Walker and Whyte have suggested that ''the relevant doctrines of human rights law and humanitarian law were not designed with private or corporate protagonists in mind''. 137 They go on to conclude that ''The opening of legitimate markets to PMCs looks less like a transfer of power from the public and the private sector than the re-regulation of security provision, a shift in the form of regulation from international human rights or humanitarian law to contract and civil law. '' 138 It is, however, the voluntary code model which is currently most influential, the process which, in the field of security for companies in the extractive sector, led to the adoption of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. This framework involves representatives from human rights organizations, trade unions, the oil companies and the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Norway. 139 In normative terms, the Principles are helpful in outlining the international standards with which private security companies are expected to comply, and the human rights obligations for which the extractive industry companies should ensure respect when engaging such private security companies. For instance, the Guidelines state that:
Private security should act in a lawful manner. They should exercise restraint and caution in a manner consistent with applicable international guidelines regarding the local use of force, including the UN Principles on the Use of In cases where physical force is used, private security should properly investigate and report the incident to the Company. Private security should refer the matter to local authorities and/or take disciplinary action where appropriate. Where force is used, medical aid should be provided to injured persons, including to offenders ...
Where appropriate, Companies should include the principles outlined above as contractual provisions in agreements with private security providers and ensure that private security personnel are adequately trained to respect the rights of employees and the local community. To the extent practicable, agreements between Companies and private security should require investigation of unlawful or abusive behavior and appropriate disciplinary action. Agreements should also permit termination of the relationship by Companies where there is credible evidence of unlawful or abusive behavior by private security personnel. The Principles may be included in contracts in a manner which would render them legally enforceable (under the law governing the contract) and there is some evidence that extraction companies are seeking to give the Principles a place, not only in their training schemes and ?discussions with stakeholders', 142 but also in their contractual relations.
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In closing this section we can point to a recent development. The British Association of Private Security Companies announces at the beginning of its website that it ''aims to raise the standards of operation of its members and this emergent industry and ensure compliance with the rules and principles of international humanitarian law and human rights standards''. 144 The Charter sets out a number of binding principles for members, including the following principle, which requires that members ''Decline to provide lethal equipment to governments or private bodies in circumstances where there is a possibility that human rights will be infringed''. It will be interesting to see the extent to which this form of self-regulation has an impact on the private military companies sector, and whether those who employ such companies start to inquire as to whether companies are members of such associations. There will be considerable interest in whether these associations successfully police and punish those members that transgress the rules. For our purposes the key point is that it is the normative framework of human rights that has caught the imagination of those concerned and surprised those who see such promises as ''un-mercenary''. 145 
Final remarks

